example, individualist cultures tend to emphasize individual self-determination, pursuit of self-interest, and self-actualization, whereas collectivist cultures tend to stress the importance of group goals over individual goals as well as traditional authority (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Hui, 1988; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Kashima et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995) . Markus and Kitayama (1991) have further emphasized that individualist and collectivist orientations are inherently linked to different conceptions of the self. In individualist cultures, independent self-construals are more prevalent, leading individuals to emphasize their personal identity as autonomous actors. Conversely, collectivism is associated with interdependent selfconstruals; that is, people identify themselves as embedded in groups and relationships rather than as separate from others.
Originally, individualism and collectivism were conceptualized as bipolar dimensions (Hofstede, 1980; Hui, 1988; Triandis, 1988) , assuming the values, goals, and self-construal associated with the two constructs were incompatible. However, an accumulation of evidence indicates individualism and collectivism are better thought of as orthogonal dimensions on which individuals and cultures can be characterized. First, observational studies indicate that, in most cultures, individualist and collectivist elements coexist, each surfacing in different contexts (Ho & Chiu, 1994; Kagitcibasi, 1987; Kim, 1994; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Yu & Yang, 1994) . Second, when measured at the individual level, individualism and collectivism often produce a number of only moderately or even unrelated factors, reflecting distinct components of the constructs (e.g., Bontempo, 1993; Kashima et al., 1995; Oyserman, 1993; Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996; Schwartz, 1994; Singelis, 1994; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis et al., 1986) . Finally, experimental studies have concluded that independent and interdependent self-construals are represented as distinct concepts in semantic memory (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991) . In other words, one can be high (or low) in both individualism and collectivism without contradiction.
ETHNIC GROUPS AND CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS: ASSUMPTIONS AND FINDINGS
The majority of individualism and collectivism research focuses on intercultural comparisons, so fewer studies have examined differences in the cultural orientations of different ethnic groups within the same society. Although the United States is a particularly interesting case due to the large number of individuals from different cultural backgrounds, differences in cultural orientations can be examined in other societies as well. Given that most within-culture research on individualism and collectivism has been conducted in the United States, we chose to follow up on this previous work.
Two standard assumptions are often made in this research: members of the three largest minority groups (African, Asian, and Latino/a American) are both higher in collectivism and lower in individualism compared to European Americans (e.g., Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Gaines et al., 1997; Rhee et al., 1996) , although the individualism assumption is often implicit. These assumptions derive from several sources. First, many people continue to view individualism and collectivism as polar opposites, necessarily constraining conceptions of group differences. When considered as orthogonal dimensions, increased levels of individualism need not be associated with lower levels of collectivism. Second, the cultural roots and traditions of minority populations are generally assumed to be collectivist to match their country of origin due to socialization processes that reflect these roots. Thus, Asian Americans are thought to be collectivist due to their Asian background (e.g., J. M. Jones, 1986; Tafarodi, Lang, & Smith, 1999; Triandis, 1995; Verkuyten & Masson, 1996) . In a related argument, individualism is sometimes considered to be "owned" by the White majority in the United States and imposed on all groups within the society (Gaines et al., 1997) . The internalization process may be passive, or minority members may actively adopt individualist values. This explanation resonates with the immigration literature, where adopting majority values is viewed as positive evidence for immigrants' acculturation to the host culture (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; Feldman & Rosenthal, 1990; D. A. Rosenthal, Bell, Demetriou, & Efklides, 1989) . Finally, it has been suggested that the historical exclusion and oppression of minorities have made in-group/out-group distinctions highly salient and fostered a sense of connectedness and solidarity with in-group members (Harrison et al., 1995; Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997) , resulting in higher levels of collectivism (Gaines et al., 1997) .
However, only one study has systematically assessed individualism and collectivism in all major ethnic groups in the United States (i.e., Americans of European, African, Asian, and Latin descent). Namely, Gaines et al. (1997) found Americans of minority groups, when taken as a whole, scored higher on collectivism than did European Americans. There were no differences between European Americans and minority members on individualism.
More frequently, studies assessing self-reported levels of individualism and/or collectivism have compared European Americans to members of only one minority group, often producing findings similar to those of Gaines et al. (1997) . Thus, compared to European Americans, higher collectivism has been found among Asian Americans (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999; Rhee et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995) , African Americans (Oyserman et al., 1995) , and Mexican Americans (Freeberg & Stein, 1996) . However, the individualism results are not as clear. Some results support a pattern of higher European American individualism compared to a minority group (Hetts et al., 1999; Rhee et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994) , but others, often within the same article or using the same measures, find no differences between European Americans and minorities (Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Hetts et al., 1999; Rhee et al., 1996; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; . Moreover, one study reported a nonsignificant trend for African Americans to be higher than European Americans in individualism (Oyserman et al., 1995) .
Aside from Gaines et al. (1997) , only one other study assessed collectivist values and behaviors in four different social contexts in all four ethnic groups. In this study, lower collectivism was found in family and friend contexts for European Americans compared to African, Asian, and Latino Americans, but no differences were found between groups in colleague and stranger contexts (Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997) . Although this study addressed collectivism in a variety of contexts, the measures did not assess individualist tendencies. This may be critical, as cultural processes may manifest themselves differently in these two domains (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, in press ).
Thus, the Gaines et al. (1997) study is in many respects the most comprehensive comparison of cultural orientations in various U.S. ethnic groups. However, it suffers from two limitations. First, although Gaines et al. measured individualism and collectivism as two separate dimensions as suggested by several researchers (Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996; Kashima et al., 1995; Oyserman, 1993; Rhee et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994) , they exclusively tapped self welfare and group welfare, respectively. This operationalization does not capture the multiple facets of the individualism and collectivism constructs. Specifically, individualism incorporates beliefs in independence and autonomy, hedonism, and uniqueness of the self in addition to the pursuit of self over group interest, whereas collectivism includes beliefs about one's obligations to others, social roles, and common fate among others of the same ethnic background in addition to group welfare (Hui, 1988; Kashima et al., 1995; Rhee et al., 1996; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Triandis et al., 1986) . By narrowly operationalizing individualism and collectivism as self versus group welfare, ethnic group differences on other central aspects of individualism or collectivism, such as autonomy or obligations to others, are necessarily unknown. The second and more serious limitation is the analytic strategy of contrasting European Americans with a generic category of "people of color" (i.e., non-European Americans), effectively homogenizing all minority groups, largely due to the lack of sufficient participants from each minority group to analyze separately (Gaines et al., 1997) . In addition, the explanations the authors provide for their results reflect this homogenizing attitude, because they argue that all minority groups come from collectivist roots and have been excluded from majority society. Homogenizing minority group members is highly problematic, because it masks potential differences among minority groups.
We argue that assuming all three minority groups (African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans) endorse individualism and collectivism to the same degree hardly does justice to the diversity in the history, heritage, and status of these groups. For example, the voluntary immigration of Asian Americans and Latino Americans to the United States to pursue economic opportunities diverges greatly from that of African Americans, whose experiences of slavery are still manifest in racist and often castelike treatment (cf. Ogbu, 1986) . Likewise, cultural stereotypes facing these groups are hardly comparable. Asian Americans are often viewed as a "model minority" with a respectable record of economic and academic achievements (Oyserman & Sakamoto, 1997; Wong, Lai, Nagasawa, & Lin, 1998) , but stereotypes about African Americans, and Latino Americans to some extent, generally reference their inferiority in these domains (e.g., Devine & Elliot, 1995) . Thus, Asian Americans tend to be more accepted by the majority, viewed as higher in status, and provided with more opportunities than members of other ethnic minorities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993) .
Of course, any study of ethnic groups runs the risk of overgeneralization, because labels tend to focus on the similarity between sets of people while neglecting variability that occurs within those sets (e.g., among subgroups). For example, the labels European American, Asian American, African American, and Latino American highlight the difference in backgrounds and experiences of groups of Americans, but these labels are silent with regard to within-group differences. In this study, we use these commonly used labels judiciously, recognizing that they do not adequately capture the diversity in backgrounds and experiences as it occurs within these groups. Yet, although acknowledging this shortcoming, we consider this approach to be superior to the homogenizing assumption that all minority groups are similar to each other.
Second, we take issue with the assumptions that have been made about the cultural orientation of minority groups in the United States in comparison to European Americans. For example, there are reasons to expect African Americans may be highly individualist. First, historian Rhett Jones (1997) has argued that European American control over resources during slavery prevented the establishment of many forms of public communalism among slaves. To protect themselves from European American domination, African American institutions, such as churches, went underground. The absence of stable communal influences required individuals to find their own personal strategies of survival, resulting in a "rugged, self-serving, sometimes selfish individualism" (R. Jones, 1997, p. 25) still evident in various aspects of African American popular culture. Although this pursuit of self-interest may be mitigated by a sense of closeness to their community, the history of African Americans may have fostered a cultural style focused on individual uniqueness and personal success.
Another argument for African American individualism derives from research on interracial interactions. African Americans, in an environment dominated by European Americans, often encounter ambiguous or hostile responses to their actions (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) . Given the history of intergroup tension and prejudice, they tend to attribute negative outcomes to their race rather than to their own performance (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998) . In other instances, they try to overcome stereotypic expectations of others to assert their own individuality (Steele & Aronson, 1995) . Thus, in an environment in which they are the targets of stereotyping and prejudice, African Americans emphasize their own uniqueness and independence. Other minority groups may not demonstrate the same pattern. For example, Asian Americans are more likely to attribute failures to internal rather than to external factors (Fry & Ghosh, 1980; Stevenson, Lee, & Stigler, 1986) , and their relatively higher status may make individualization a less likely response (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998) . Therefore, African Americans may endorse individualist values to the same degree, or even a greater degree, than European Americans. This prediction may appear to fly in the face of earlier research, but only one study has specifically contrasted individualism between European Americans and African Americans, finding a nonsignificant trend for greater African American individualism (Oyserman et al., 1995) .
It is important to note that the above arguments about African American individualism and collectivism are not mutually exclusive. Trends may occur simultaneously because they are orthogonal dimensions. It is possible, as Gaines et al. (1997) hypothesized, that all minority groups in the United States will show high levels of collectivism and African Americans will also show increased levels of individualism compared to European Americans.
THE PRESENT STUDY
Our first goal was to examine levels of individualism and collectivism among the four largest ethnic groups in the United States. We collected data on five samples of college students, including a number of minority students. We used three orthogonal measures of individualism and collectivism that tap different aspects of these constructs, allowing us to generalize our findings to the constructs themselves, rather than a specific means of assessing them. Using meta-analytic techniques, we compared levels of individualism and collectivism of European Americans to those of African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans separately. In addition, we examined the stability of these ethnic differences by investigating whether the same patterns were observed in both men and women. Finally, we incorporated data from Gaines et al. (1997) into our analysis, providing us with additional assessments of individualism and collectivism as well as a population from another area of the country.
Our second goal was to evaluate the comparability of the scales used to assess individualism and collectivism across the four ethnic groups. Many individualism-collectivism measures have been developed with and tested on some but not other ethnic groups. For example, Singelis (1994) validated his self-construal scales by comparing an Asian American and a European American sample. Thus, a scale's ability to assess individualism and collectivism adequately in all groups is in question. Adequate assessment should be evidenced in the psychometric properties of the scales, including their internal consistency and the correlations between scales across ethnic groups.
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
We collected data on five samples of undergraduate students, all from the University of Michigan, between 1995 and 1998. Students received course credit in exchange for participation in the study, except in Sample 3, in which participation was voluntary. Sample 1 included 384 students (190 males, 194 females; mean age = 20.0 years), Sample 2 consisted of 147 students (73 males and 74 females; mean age = 19.3 years), Sample 3 consisted of 316 students (159 males, 157 females; mean age = 20.6 years), Sample 4 consisted of 170 students (72 males, 98 females; mean age = 18.8 years), and Sample 5 consisted of 532 students (234 males, 298 females; mean age = 18.7 years).
All samples were composed of students who described themselves as European American, African American, Latino American, or Asian American. In Samples 1 to 4, ethnic group membership was assessed with open-ended responses. Responses such as "White," "Caucasian," and "European American" were classified as European American. Responses such as "Black," "Afro-American," and "African American" were recorded as African American. As Latino, we counted not only responses such as "Latino/a," "Hispanic," and "Chicano" but also those including country of origin (e.g., "Mexican American"). A similar rule was used to identify Asian Americans, who responded either "Asian American" or named a specific heritage (e.g., "Chinese American"). In Sample 5, participants identified their ethnicity by checking the appropriate item from a list: Asian/Pacific Islander, Black/ African American, Hispanic/Latino, Native American, White/of European origin, or other (please specify). In addition, participants were asked how long they had lived in the United States. Only students in the four main ethnic groups who had lived in the United States their entire lives were included in the present study. Individuals who described themselves as multiethnic or who did not describe their own race or ethnicity were not included. Across all five samples, there were 1,086 European Americans (55% female), 219 African Americans (65% female), 159 Asian Americans (46% female), and 47 Latino Americans (45% female). The ethnic group distribution of each sample is provided in Table 1 .
MEASURES OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM
Sample 1. We used Singelis' (1994) scales to measure independent and interdependent self-construals, which represent central features of individualism and collectivism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) . Each of the scales comprised 12 items (independence α = .70, interdependence α = .74). Sample items include "I enjoy being unique and different from others" (independence) and "I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in" (interdependence). Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Samples 2 and 3. We used modified versions of Singelis' (1994) independence and interdependence scales, using only eight items per scale. For Sample 2, internal consistencies were α = .67 and α = .68, respectively, and in Sample 3, they were α = .64 and α = .66, respectively.
Sample 4. We used a shortened version of Triandis's (1995) (see also measures of vertical individualism (VI), horizontal individualism (HI), vertical collectivism (VC), and horizontal collectivism (HC), eliminating items that attenuated scale reliability. Eight items measured VI (e.g., "It is important for me that I do my job better than others"), four items tapped HI (e.g., "I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways"), six items assessed VC (e.g., "I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it"), and eight items assessed HC ("It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group"). The alpha reliabilities were as follows: VI α = .82, HI α = .68, VC α = .56, and HC α = .63. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). (Oyserman, in press ). The individualism scale assesses people's beliefs about their uniqueness (e.g., "I prefer being able to be different from others"), the emphasis they place on achievement (e.g., "To know who I really am, you must examine my achievements and accomplishments"), and their beliefs about the freedom they have to make choices (e.g., "If I make my own choices, I will be more happy than if I listen to others") (α = .82). The collectivism scale assesses connectedness to family (e.g., "I often turn to my family for social and emotional support"), the interrelatedness and identification with in-group members (e.g., "To know who I am, you must see me with members of my group"), and sharing a common fate with a religious, national, or ethnic group (e.g., "It is important for me to think of myself as a member of my religious, national, or ethnic group) (α = .86). Responses use a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree).
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RESULTS

META-ANALYTIC INTEGRATION
We used meta-analysis to examine differences between ethnic groups across the five samples (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . Table 1 indicates the means of the individualist and collectivist constructs for each ethnic group in all samples. For each possible pair of groups, we computed Hedges's g for both individualism and collectivism (i.e., we divided the mean difference by the pooled standard deviation). Because some of our samples were small, we applied the sample size correction suggested by Hedges and Olkin. As a result, the statistic reported is the corrected difference score d. Positive values of d for the difference between Groups A and B indicate that Group A is higher than Group B, and negative values of d indicate Group B is higher than Group A. Following Cohen (1988) , effect sizes of less than .4 can be described as small, those from .4 to .7 as moderate, and those above .7 as large. Expressed in terms of Pearson correlation coefficients, d = .40 corresponds to r = .20, and d = .70 to r = .33.
Individualism. For the individualism meta-analysis, we used Singelis's (1994) independence scale from Samples 1, 2, and 3. From Sample 4, we selected only the HI scale (Triandis, 1995) . We made this decision because the HI and VI scales were not correlated, r(170) = -.05, p > .56, and therefore have to be treated as distinct constructs. The HI scale was chosen because its items more closely resembled those of the Oyserman (in press) and Singelis's (1994) scales, whereas the VI scale items did not because of its exclusive focus on competition. From Sample 5, we used the individualism subscale of the Oyserman (in press) scale.
As summarized in Table 2 , we found, across all five samples, African Americans scored higher on individualism measures than both European Americans (d = .30) and Asian Americans (d = .33). In both cases, the effect sizes were small, as noted by Cohen (1988) . No other group differences emerged from the individualism meta-analysis. Of particular notice, none of the three minority groups scored systematically lower on individualism compared to members of the U.S. majority, replicating previous findings (e.g., Gaines et al., 1997; Oyserman et al., in press) .
We also examined our data for gender differences, repeating all group comparisons separately for men and women. We found the results for males and females to be similar. In other words, both African American males and females were more individualist than their European American and Asian American counterparts. No other significant differences emerged.
Collectivism. For a parallel meta-analysis on collectivism, we used Singelis's (1994) interdependence scale for Samples 1, 2, and 3. For Sample 4, we averaged scores on the HC and VC scales to obtain an overall collectivism measure; as in this case, the HC and VC scales were significantly correlated with each other, r(171) = .40, p < .001, and themes from both scales are reflected in Oyserman's (in press) and Singelis's (1994) measures. For Sample 5, we used the Oyserman (in press) collectivism subscale. As shown in Table 3 , compared to European Americans, both Asian Americans (d = .21) and African Americans (d = .15) scored systematically higher in collectivism. No other significant effects emerged. In both cases, effect sizes were again small.
The pattern for gender differences was somewhat more complex. First, for the comparison between European Americans and African Americans, the difference fell short of conventional levels of significance when men and women were examined separately but still reflected the overall trend. Similarly, Asian Americans as a whole were lower in collectivism than European Americans, but only for males was the comparison significant. Last, Latino men tended to be slightly higher in collectivism than European American, African American, and Asian American men, but only the comparison with the latter group was statistically 356 
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GENERALIZABILITY OF THE FINDINGS
We wanted to determine whether our findings were idiosyncratic to student samples at the University of Michigan or on par with data from other samples. Thus, we conducted an additional meta-analysis incorporating all data published in Gaines et al. (1997) . That is, we included Gaines et al.'s Samples 2 and 6 from Study 1 and Samples 1 and 2 from Study 2 in the present comparisons of mean differences on measures of individualism and collectivism. Instead of collapsing African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos into the generic category of people of color, we treated each of the four ethnic groups as distinct units. Without exception, these additional analyses closely paralleled the ones reported above. That is, when people of color were not grouped together, Gaines et al.' comparisons was the homogeneity test significant; hence, the meta-analytic differences can be generalized.
COMPARISON OF SCALE CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS ETHNIC GROUPS
Scale reliability. To address whether our various measurements of individualism and collectivism were equivalent across ethnic groups, we first meta-analyzed the reliability scores of our measures, again comparing each pair of ethnic groups. For this purpose, we computed Cronbach's alpha separately for each ethnic group within each sample. Treating the alpha coefficients as equivalent to Pearson correlation coefficients, we computed Cohen's q as an effect size measure of differences in the reliability of the measurement instrument used (cf. R. Rosenthal, 1994) .
Across the five samples, there were no reliability differences in the measurement of individualism. That is, the overall Cronbach's alphas provided in the Method sections are good estimates for the internal consistency of the scale for each ethnic group. However, this was not the case for the reliability of the collectivism measures. The alphas for African Americans were systematically lower than those for Asian Americans, Cohen's q = .40, Z = 3.52, p < .001; Latino Americans, Cohen's q = .37, Z = 1.69, p < .10; and European Americans, Cohen's q = .30, Z = 3.84, p < .0001. For all three meta-analytic comparisons, the homogeneity test was not significant, indicating that the effect sizes did not vary substantially across the five samples, Q(4) = 3.97, p > .41, Q(4) = 4.43, p > .20, and Q(4) = 5.67, p > .20, respectively. This finding raises questions about the adequacy of the present collectivism measures for African Americans. In particular, it points to the necessity in future research of cross-validating the factor structures of individualism-collectivism measures in different ethnic groups. Indeed, Oyserman et al. (1995, Study 1) reported results from a Rasch scaling analysis suggesting that the same scale may assess different underlying dimensions in African Americans and European Americans. Individualism-collectivism correlations. Next, we examined the pattern of intercorrelations between the individualism and the collectivism measures used in this study. Recall that current theorizing in cultural psychology conceptualizes individualism and collectivism as distinct and orthogonal psychological dimensions (Bontempo, 1993; Gelfand et al., 1996; Oyserman, 1993; Singelis, 1994; Trafimow et al., 1991) . This should translate into low and nonsignificant correlations between measures of individualism and collectivism. Most recent measures (including those used in the present study) were constructed to measure individualism and collectivism as uncorrelated dimensions.
To examine this assumption in each of the ethnic groups, we computed correlations for each sample as well as for each ethnic group within each sample. As shown in Table 4 , in Samples 1 through 4 the correlations between individualism and collectivism measures were nonsignificant. There was variability across ethnic groups, with some correlation coefficients being sizable; yet, none of them were statistically reliable. Only in Sample 5 were the measures consistently significantly positively correlated, presumably because of the particular characteristics of Oyserman's (in press) measure. These results suggest that different measures of individualism and collectivism are capturing different aspects of these constructs.
Finally, to compare these correlational findings across ethnic groups, we conducted a meta-analysis of the correlations between individualism and collectivism in all samples. For this purpose, we converted all correlation coefficients into Fisher's z scores and separately tested whether the combined correlation was significantly different from zero for each ethnic group. Subsequently, the combined effect sizes were reconverted into Pearson correlations. For European Americans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans, we found that individualism and collectivism were not substantively correlated, r = .01, Z = .32, p > .10; r = .12, Z = 1.43, p > .10; and r = -.01, Z = -.03, p > .10, respectively. Mainly due to inclusion of Sample 5, there was significant variability in the size of the correlation for European Americans, Q(4) = 18.90, p < .001. This was not the case for Asian Americans and Latinos, for whom the effect sizes were homogeneous, Q(4) = 5.54, p > .24 and Q(4) = 1.53, p > .83, respectively. The pattern of results was different for African Americans: Across all five samples, individualism and collectivism were positively correlated, r = .28, Z = 4.06, p < .001. This effect size was homogeneous, Q(4) = 6.48, p > .17.
DISCUSSION
This study provides support for the argument that ethnic minority groups are not necessarily alike with regard to their individualist and collectivist orientations yet supports some of the tenets of earlier work (e.g., Gaines et al., 1997) . The results are surprisingly consistent across measures and samples. However, several potential problems, including measurement issues and the lack of representativeness of the samples, qualify the generalizability of the findings.
First, African Americans and Asian Americans were higher in collectivism compared to European Americans. This finding is consistent with the arguments set out by Gaines et al. (1997) , namely, that the cultural practices of minority groups are linked to country of origin (J. M. Jones, 1986; Triandis, 1995) and that exclusion from the majority renders minority identity highly salient and fosters a sense of connectedness with other group members. However, we have no direct evidence regarding the processes behind these results, so hypotheses about the origins of collectivism are premature. Unlike Freeberg and Stein (1996) but in conjunction with Matsumoto et al. (1997) , we did not find that Latino Americans differed from any other group. This result may reflect differences in their experiences of exclusion and prejudice, but we also may have too few Latino American participants to find any significant results. Among Asian Americans and Latino Americans, these findings were stronger in men than women. With regard to individualism, one of our most robust findings is the high scores of African Americans compared to European Americans and Asian Americans. This result was found in all samples, across four different assessments, including the one used by Gaines and colleagues (1997) , and is consistent with R. Jones's (1997) claim that African Americans may have developed an individualist orientation as a survival mechanism to cope with exclusion from the dominant society. Research on African American self-esteem is also compatible. Across many studies, the self-esteem of African Americans is as high or higher than that of European Americans (Crocker & Major, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979; Twenge & Crocker, 1999) , and individualism is often associated with high self-esteem (Carter & Dinnel, 1997; Hetts et al., 1999) . Third, our finding is also consistent with the notion that African Americans assert their individuality in the face of stereotypic expectations to avoid being reduced to representatives of their ethnic group (Steele & Aronson, 1995) . Racism may emphasize personal uniqueness and independence from social context, leading to greater individualism. In addition, the social identity literature has viewed individualization as one strategy those with a negative identity can use to cope with the implications of out-group members' responses (e.g., Blanz et al., 1998) . Individualization is most likely to occur when individuals cannot leave their group and is often found when the in-group is of lower social status than the out-group, as is the case with African Americans. In sum, the specific history of African Americans and their continuing exposure to prejudice may have led to greater in-group coherence and solidarity but simultaneously created an emphasis on personal uniqueness and the pursuit of self-interest that helps to deal with coping in a majoritydominated social world.
In addition, high African American individualism is incompatible with the implicit notion that U.S. individualism is owned by the European American majority. Specifically, research on acculturation and on social domination of other ethnic groups often assumes that traditionally less individualist groups ultimately reach individualism levels comparable to European Americans via ongoing assimilation or cultural domination (D. A. Rosenthal et al., 1989; Sidanius et al., 1997) . The results from this study question this assumption and draw attention to the possibility that an even more individualist orientation can emerge as a function of the unique experience of a group within an already individualist society. One interesting direction for future research to pursue would be to examine how individualist and collectivist orientations change as a function of acculturation to Western culture or as a function of ethnic identity.
However, a number of issues must be addressed to place these results in context. First, several measurement problems complicate the picture, including variability across scales and ethnic groups. Although we did not find this problem with the individualism measures, the reliability of the collectivism measures was low for African Americans, suggesting this measurement may be compromised for this group. Many collectivism scales have been validated using Asian and Asian American samples or were created specifically with Asians as a comparison group to European Americans (e.g., Singelis, 1994; , hence the notion of collectivism as assessed by these scales may be more appropriate to European Americans and Asian Americans than to African Americans. In other words, for African Americans, collectivism may represent a different set of factors than it does for other groups. Given that more than 100 articles have assessed individualism and collectivism within the United States and cross-culturally (Oyserman et al., in press) , it is surprising that only a few have systematically examined the factor structures of individualism and collectivism across different groups (e.g., Bontempo, 1993) . We know of only one study that examined the factor structure of individualism and collectivism in two ethnic groups within the same culture (European Americans vs. Asian Americans; Rhee et al., 1996) . As our findings indicate, it is imperative that future work compare the factor structure of individualism and collectivism in different ethnic groups in the same society.
A second measurement problem concerns the content of the scales, which assess different aspects of individualism and collectivism. For example, the measure used by Gaines et al. (1997) focuses exclusively on self versus group welfare. Singelis's (1994) scale taps independent and interdependent self-construals, whereas the horizontal/vertical distinction made by further characterizes individualism and collectivism on the degree to which they involve hierarchy and competition. Oyserman's (in press) scale focuses on three aspects of individualism (uniqueness, achievement, and freedom) and collectivism (family, close others, and national, ethnic, and religious groups). Given this diversity in measurement, the consistency of the findings is remarkable. Nonetheless, such all-inclusive definitions of individualism and collectivism are potentially too broad (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Oyserman et al., in press; Schwartz, 1990) . In fact, the modest intercorrelations between individualism and collectivism in Sample 5 may simply be an idiosyncrasy of Oyserman's (in press) scale. Issues of scale measurement obviously have implications for the cross-cultural researchers who use these measures. More than 20 scales have been used to assess individualism and collectivism with North Americans, and they vary in a number of important features, including the content of the questions, the populations in which they have been used, and their internal reliability (Coon & Oyserman, 2000) . All researchers need to take care when using these measures, because their results may be dependent on the particular scale used.
Second, the finding that African Americans score higher on both individualism and collectivism raises the concern whether particular responding styles but not genuine endorsement of the items may have produced this result (cf. Bachman & O'Malley, 1984) . However, we believe this explanation does not hold. First, the distribution of responses on the questionnaire items tend to be continuous and normal and do not reveal a disproportionate accumulation of responses at the top and bottom end of the response scale. Second, two of our samples also responded to Altemeyer's (1988) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale. On this scale, African Americans were very likely to choose the midpoint of the 9-point response scale, whereas all other ethnic groups exhibited a more extreme response style.
A third issue is the use of college students as participants, who may not be representative of the population as a whole, reflecting a self-selection process. That is, the cultural orientation of college students may differ from those of young adults who do not attend college. This issue may be particularly salient for minority students. For example, African American students, who as a whole come from less privileged backgrounds, may need a high level of personal determination and belief in their own uniqueness and abilities to make it to college and succeed there. Similarly, minority students in majority-dominated contexts may differ from those who choose to live in in-group-dominated environments. Therefore, minority students at a predominately White institution may be those who have learned how to succeed in that context or who feel more comfortable in that environment. However, we are encouraged by the fact that our reanalysis of the data from Gaines et al. (1997) , which included nonstudents, showed the same pattern as our data. Thus, although the pattern of observed differences between groups may vary in different populations or cohorts, there is no evidence of this trend from the existing data.
Finally, we ourselves are guilty of the overgeneralization with regard to group homogeneity. All of the ethnic groups encompass vast differences, and each is composed of individuals from many diverse backgrounds. To assume that all Asian Americans, African Americans, Latino Americans, and European Americans share the same experiences and history is presumptuous. Ethnic category labels are convenient but mask many within-group distinctions. Moreover, ethnic categories are evolving cultural artifacts (e.g., Omi, 1994) , capturing only part of the richness of various communities and (sub)cultures in the United States. Thus, cross-ethnic comparisons such as the one presented in this article can only provide a glimpse into cultural orientations as a function of currently used and widely accepted ethnic labels. Again, degree of exposure to U.S. culture may also be an important factor when it comes to endorsement of individualist and collectivist values, but this work has not yet been done.
Given these caveats, the current research still stands as a significant testament to the issue of minority and majority differences in cultural orientation. As Gaines et al. (1997) discuss, it is important to move away from a monolithic view of cultures. Moreover, because much cross-cultural research uses country as a stand-in for individualism and/or collectivism, it is necessary to address the limitations of these dichotomies. Future research needs to address which aspects of individualism and collectivism may differ across groups within a country as well as between countries, such as the recent research by Triandis and colleagues, which has attempted to distinguish vertical and horizontal aspects of individualism and collectivism (see Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . In addition, we need to determine the effects of long-and short-term enculturation as well as exposure to U.S. culture on cultural orientations. Although they have been extensively measured and studied, individualism and collectivism are problematic constructs. In many respects, they are often conceived of too broadly (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Schwartz, 1990) , and better care is needed in their application if we are to understand their implications.
